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INTRODUCTION 
This Essay proposes a very specific strategy for leveraging 
Opportunity Zone (OZ) funding to alleviate poverty, limit the harms 
of gentrification, and support the expansion of income-generating 
opportunities in OZs.  The strategy builds on important work in 
urban cores that has been ongoing for decades.  Briefly described, this 
Essay proposes significantly greater regulatory and programmatic 
support for community banks to leverage OZ funding to support local 
business networks.  Part I of this Essay describes the importance of 
local business networks as drivers of poverty alleviation and economic 
development in urban cores, a good number of which have been 
designated as OZs.  Part I argues that OZ funding should support 
such networks, and further that community banks have the potential 
to play a uniquely powerful role in these efforts.  Part II of this Essay 
 
* Professor, Northeastern University School of Law; Affiliate Professor of Public 
Policy and Urban Affairs, Northeastern University. I am grateful to Nestor Davidson 
for inspiring me to think about the connections between collaborative capitalism and 
Opportunity Zones and to the symposium editors of the Fordham Urban Law 
Journal for organizing a terrific symposium on Opportunity Zones. I received superb 
research assistance from Milo Vieland. 
1228 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVIII 
proposes a regulatory approach for enhancing opportunities for 
community banks to fulfill this potential. 
At the outset, it is important to state a core assumption underlying 
this Essay that I and others have elaborated elsewhere in broader 
discussions of poverty alleviation and economic development.1  The 
assumption begins with the recognition that the goals and strategies 
for poverty alleviation and local economic development can and do 
regularly conflict.  It also acknowledges that the OZ program and 
predecessor programs such as the Clinton-era Empowerment Zones 
program may well have articulated the coequal prioritization of both 
goals, but that in practice they have prioritized economic 
development.2  By contrast, this Essay assumes that it will be 
necessary for the OZ program to explicitly prioritize poverty 
alleviation above economic development.3  This Essay’s focus, 
therefore, is on programmatic and regulatory reforms to the OZ 
program that enhance its ability to alleviate poverty in areas 
designated as OZs. 
I. COLLABORATIVE BUSINESS NETWORKS IN OPPORTUNITY 
ZONES AND THE VALUE ADDED BY COMMUNITY BANKS 
Despite the newness of the Opportunity Zone program, there is 
already a growing consensus that OZ funding is not currently 
reaching those who most need it and would benefit from it.4  This is 
because, as presently structured, OZs are too indirect a mechanism 
 
 1. See generally RASHMI DYAL-CHAND, COLLABORATIVE CAPITALISM IN 
AMERICAN CITIES: REFORMING URBAN MARKET REGULATIONS (2018) (discussing 
extensively, especially in Chapter 3, the reasons underlying this assumption and the 
literature discussing such reasons). 
 2. See Ellen P. Aprill, Caution: Enterprise Zones, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341, 1344 
(1993). 
 3. See DYAL-CHAND, supra note 1, at 57. For discussions of the goals of 
community development organizations, see WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL 
POLICY 3–5 (2002); Rashmi Dyal-Chand & James V. Rowan, Developing 
Capabilities, Not Entrepreneurs: A New Theory for Community Economic 
Development, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 851–52, 894 (2014); Scott L. Cummings, 
Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots 
Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399, 400–02 (2001); Michael E. 
Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 
1995, https://hbr.org/1995/05/the-competitive-advantage-of-the-inner-city 
[https://perma.cc/DN39-UGTZ]. 
 4. Robert Frank, ‘Opportunity Zones’ Fall Short on Helping Low-Income 
Communities, Study Finds, CNBC (June 17, 2020, 12:50 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/17/opportunity-zones-fall-short-on-helping-low-
income-communities-study.html [https://perma.cc/AHP5-QQ4R]. 
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for poverty alleviation.  They rely too much on the assumption that 
investments in larger businesses without direct ties to neighborhoods 
designated as OZs will spread the benefits of those investments to 
local residents.5  In reality, according to a mid-2020 report: 
Almost 97% of the more than $10 billion raised by opportunity 
funds so far has been raised by funds focused on commercial or 
residential real estate . . . . Much of that money likely will be spent 
on projects that have been in the works for years and have a high 
expected return, such as high-end apartment buildings.6 
A recent, detailed analysis by Michelle Layser supports this 
conclusion.7  Analyzing data from the New Markets Tax Credit 
(NMTC) program, Layser concludes that both the NMTC program 
and the OZ program will likely produce “inefficient and inequitable” 
outcomes, often because they invest in gentrifying neighborhoods.8  
In short, the OZ program assumes too much that beneficial spillovers 
will occur from investments tied only to geography.9 
Reports such as this indicate that it is imperative that the OZ 
program be reformed to provide substantial investments directly to 
 
 5. A 2020 Urban Institute report notes, “The OZ incentive is distinctive in 
that . . . it allows [Qualified Opportunity Funds] to self-certify, meaning they are not 
required to have a social-impact mission, nor to be governed or advised by 
community members . . . . [T]he OZ program provides no opportunity for citizen 
input about proposed projects, or even a role for a state or local government . . . to 
prioritize the types of projects that should receive incentives once the state 
government has selected its Zones.” BRETT THEODOS ET AL., URB. INST., AN EARLY 
ASSESSMENT OF OPPORTUNITY ZONES FOR EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: 




 6. Sophie Quinton, Black Businesses Largely Miss Out on Opportunity Zone 
Money, PEW (June 24, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/06/24/black-businesses-largely-miss-out-on-opportunity-
zone-money [https://perma.cc/9U3Y-4P6V]. 
 7. Michelle D. Layser, Subsidizing Gentrification: A Spatial Analysis of Place-
Based Tax Incentives, UC IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 60). 
 8. Id. (finding “the Opportunity Zones law overwhelmingly rewards profit 
motive and are more likely than NMTC investors to actively seek profit opportunities 
in gentrifying areas”). 
 9. As one commentator recently observed about Opportunity Zones: “The 
initial idea was that they’re going to be opportunity zones, and that it would be 
targeted towards low- and moderate-income communities, and it is by geography, but 
by no other targeting.” Lydia O’Neal & David Hood, Local Lenders Stay Sidelined 
as Cash Flows to Opportunity Zones, BLOOMBERG TAX (Nov. 30, 2020, 4:46 AM), 
https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/local-lenders-stay-sidelined-as-cash-
flows-to-opportunity-zones [https://perma.cc/ME47-4S4W] (quoting Michael Swack, 
director of the University of New Hampshire’s Center for Impact Finance). 
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the long-time residents of OZs.  Furthermore, such financial 
investments must include investments not only in housing but also in 
the development of local jobs and other income-generating 
opportunities.  While affordable housing is crucial, the OZ program 
(like the Enterprise Zones and Empowerment Zones programs 
before it) must play a significant role in providing long-term financial 
support for the development of stable, income-generating 
opportunities.10  In particular, as has been argued elsewhere, by 
supporting small, local businesses started and owned by local 
residents, such programs can provide deep systemic support for the 
creation and maintenance of local jobs, career ladders, and local 
business ownership.11 
Given its limitations as a tax benefit program, it is good news that 
OZ investments do not have to be made on a blank canvas.  The 
primary task of the OZ program need not be to find market 
opportunities and support the creation of new businesses or business 
clusters.  Successful small businesses already exist in urban cores 
across the country.12  However, while some of these businesses have 
been successful for decades, most are under-capitalized.  In a recent 
book, Collaborative Capitalism in American Cities: Reforming Urban 
Market Regulations, I used a case study methodology to examine 
such businesses, focusing in particular on what I termed 
“collaborative business networks.”13  Collaborative business 
networks, which exist in many OZs, could certainly benefit from 
financial investments. Thus, a highly efficacious use of OZ funding 
would be to target such networks with long-term financial 
investments.  To develop this argument, it is important first to 
 
 10. Like the OZ program, the Enterprise Zones and Empowerment Zones 
programs were tax benefit programs intended to channel private dollars into urban 
cores, with the explicit intent to fuel business development among other goals. 
Indeed, business and job development were the explicit goals of the Enterprise Zone 
program, though it is widely described as producing mixed results. See Aprill, supra 
note 2, at 1344; see also Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space, and Place: The 
Geography of Economic Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 324–25 (1999). 
 11. See Dyal-Chand & Rowan, supra note 3, at 901; see also Roger A. Clay, Jr. & 
Susan R. Jones, What Is Community Economic Development?, in BUILDING 
HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR 
ADVOCATES, LAWYERS, AND POLICYMAKERS 3, 11 (Roger A. Clay, Jr. & Susan R. 
Jones eds., 2009). See generally Susan R. Jones, Small Business and Community 
Economic Development: Transactional Lawyering for Social Change and Economic 
Justice, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 195 (1997). 
 12. See generally DYAL-CHAND, supra note 1. 
 13. See id. at 1–13. Portions of this Part originally appeared in the book and are 
being published with permission but have been revised for this Essay. 
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describe such networks more fully and also to consider why they are 
particularly well-suited to poverty alleviation efforts. 
While collaborative business networks vary widely in their 
structures, industries, locations, and other characteristics, there is a 
clear pattern in their approach.  As I wrote in the book, 
The most important commonality is that the ventures involve 
networks of businesses that collaborate with each other. Their 
collaboration typically entails the sharing of key resources — such as 
training and vocational education, labor, financing, market data, 
suppliers and supplies, management expertise, and physical space — 
as a means of reducing costs for the network as a whole and for each 
business in the network.  The sharing also typically makes use of 
local ties to instill a strong connection to a local community.   Often 
this means that the businesses in the network have multiple “bottom 
lines.”  And the sharing within these networks consistently produces 
long-term, stable income for the workers.14 
In particular, collaborative business networks have six defining 
features.15  While all of these criteria seem critical to the operation 
and success of collaborative business networks, they do not 
necessarily constitute an exhaustive list.  The first three criteria 
describe the particular form of collaboration of these networks.  First, 
businesses involved in collaborative business networks typically share 
extensively within a closed network that operates in a discrete 
market, defined both geographically and by industry or market 
sector.16  Within this literal and figurative space, the businesses 
involved in the network act in a coordinated or collective manner.17  
They share a great deal of information and other resources that each 
business would typically have to acquire and manage on its own, but 
the businesses instead share within the entire network.18 
A second core feature of such networks is that they involve one or 
more institutions that serve as the glue among the businesses, helping 
them to share and to act in a coordinated manner.19  Regularly such 
institutions, which include local nonprofits, unions, and financial 
institutions, act on the collective behalf of the small businesses.  They 
 
 14. Id. at 5. 
 15. Id. at 61. 
 16. Id. at 61–64. 
 17. See id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See generally Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of 
Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). 
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also regularly support the ability of such businesses to prioritize goals 
beyond profit making. 
The third feature, which also fundamentally defines the form of 
collaboration, is that the businesses within the networks coordinate in 
a way that lowers their individual costs of doing business.20  They also 
regularly manage risk in a coordinated manner.21  Again, by doing so, 
they externalize to the network as a whole the costs and risks that 
each individual business would otherwise bear.  It is reasonable to 
expect that this behavior has helped many of the businesses involved 
to perform better than they otherwise would have, including by 
surviving for longer than the average start-up small business.22 
The other three core features of such networks are not definitional 
of the form of collaboration, but rather seem crucial to the success of 
these networks in alleviating poverty, providing stability to their 
workers, and even spurring stable economic development in urban 
cores.  The fourth feature is that the businesses involved in these 
networks seem to prioritize goals other than, and in addition to, profit 
making.23  These goals can include poverty alleviation, local hiring, 
worker democracy, environmental sustainability, neighborhood 
revitalization, and other priorities.24  The explicit prioritization of 
these multiple bottom lines seems to drive many of the decisions of 
these businesses, including at times by providing an incentive to 
share. 
The fifth feature is that the various stakeholders in the businesses, 
including the management, workers, financing sources, customers, 
and suppliers are predominantly insiders.25  The status of insider is 
very often defined geographically.26  It is also regularly defined by 
social and ethnic ties.27  While the multiple and close forms of 
connection within these networks seem related to the successful 
definition of market niches and other business imperatives, these 
connections also provide a level of investment in, and even 
 
 20. DYAL-CHAND, supra note 1, at 66. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. at 51–55 (reviewing the literature on small business success in the 
United States). 
 23. See id. at 66–67 
 24. See id. 
 25. Id. at 67. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 61. 
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accountability to, the local communities in which these networks 
operate.28 
Finally, and relatedly, a core feature of these networks is that they 
typically operate within a niche market or industry.29  Moreover, 
these market niches typically are responsive to local community 
needs, providing special products or services for such communities.30  
Often the particular niches are also especially responsive to the 
coordinated behavior of the businesses.31 
As to the question of why collaborative business networks are so 
well-suited to poverty alleviation, the answer is straightforward: these 
networks tend to focus on maximizing value for the benefit of the 
long-term, often low-income, residents of the area.32  The businesses 
in the network cut the costs of doing business by sharing resources so 
that each can have a better chance of success.  The fact that they do 
so alongside a commitment to hiring local and low-income residents 
allows these successes to accrue to those in the urban core most in 
need of the public and private investments in that network.  This 
approach has been especially efficacious in markets where 
competition has traditionally involved cutting wages to remain 
competitive in the pricing of services.33 
Thus, this collaborative form of doing business is a better choice 
for urban core contexts because of the multiple bottom lines that 
involve a worker-centered approach.  By supporting collaborative 
business networks that have succeeded in promoting a fuller range of 
goals, policymakers can respond more directly, accurately, and 
successfully to the needs of residents in OZs.  In short, collaborative 
business networks are an ideal choice for Opportunity Zone 
investments. 
The final piece of the argument about an ideal strategy for 
leveraging OZ funding is not only that the OZ program should target 
collaborative business networks in OZs but that it should rely on 
community banks both to find such networks and to channel OZ 
funding to such networks.  Indeed, my book examines the role of 
community banks, focusing specifically on a case study in which a 
major community development bank, ShoreBank in Chicago, 
 
 28. Id. at 67. 
 29. Id. at 68–69. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 69. 
 33. See id. at 43. See generally id. at 17–49. 
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supported a network of residential apartments-rehabbing businesses 
for decades.34 
As the research underlying the book suggests, banks situated 
within collaborative business networks may well be the most powerful 
means of supporting such networks, because community banks have a 
unique potential to support the early development as well as the 
ongoing stability of businesses participating in collaborative business 
networks.35  For example, because of its multiple bottom lines, 
ShoreBank worked as a collaborative partner alongside the rehabbing 
businesses in the network.36  It provided a steady stream of capital 
that was readily accessible without many of the usual constraints 
imposed by private banks.  It grew clients over the course of decades.  
It tailored repayment terms to its borrowers’ needs, thereby making 
debt financing less risky overall.  In the United States, a community 
bank of this sort may well be the ideal financing source for an urban 
collaborative business network.37 
By extension, it is reasonable also to conclude that banks situated 
adjacent to such networks, even if not necessarily within them, are 
well positioned to support the businesses in such networks and 
beyond.  Reliable studies indicate that community banks provide 
significantly more financing to small businesses than their aggregate 
lending share.38  Thus, it is likely that such banks are more informed 
about local businesses than other financing sources would be.  
 
 34. See id. at 75–117. 
 35. Id. at 177, 260. For a far more extensive discussion of this issue, see Chapters 
4, 7, and 10. See id. 
 36. Id. at 230. 
 37. See id. at 114 (explaining that, from “lowering critical costs, to prioritizing a 
focus on local neighborhood development, to finding and exploiting an ideal niche 
market, [Shore]Bank . . . did the work that several coordinating intermediaries 
typically do together in national coordinated economies”). 
 38. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY 4-1 (2020), 
https://www.fdic.gov/resources/community-banking/report/2020/2020-cbi-study-
full.pdf [https://perma.cc/79ND-GC78] (finding that, although “community banks 
tend to be relatively small, . . . their lending far exceeds their aggregate lending 
share”); see also Frank Sorrentino, Community Banks Play Critical Role in Helping 
America’s Small Businesses Get Back to Business, FORBES (Apr. 24, 2020, 2:21 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/franksorrentino/2020/04/24/community-banks-play-
critical-role-in-helping-americas-small-businesses-get-back-to-
business/?sh=5c1fa4c514af [https://perma.cc/ZS6X-YB3X] (“[I]t’s no surprise that 
community and regional banks were better positioned to service their clients 
efficiently amidst COVID-19. Community banks have established relationships with 
clients, can be nimble and operate through a relationship banking model, have deep 
personal knowledge of clients and the communities they serve, which in turn allows 
faster and more efficient engagement.”). 
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Moreover, even if such banks are not aware of local networks, they 
have the means to become aware of them, so long as they receive 
proper resources and incentives.  By hiring and training local loan 
officers, who are from the communities they serve, community banks 
can access local knowledge and networks in order to find businesses 
that have the potential to succeed.39  Indeed, there is every reason to 
believe that local loan officers would do a better job of finding worthy 
borrowers, and accurately assessing their creditworthiness, than other 
local institutions such as policy or planning agencies.  Not only would 
such officers have the ability to develop the necessary knowledge to 
do so, they also would have the incentive.40  Thus, in terms of raw 
impact, the best way to generate something akin to patient capital, 
namely financing that is maintained “even in the face of adverse 
short-term conditions,”41 for collaborative business networks may be 
to channel financing through local banks. 
II. REGULATORY REFORMS TO HARNESS THE POWER OF 
COMMUNITY BANKS 
This Part takes up the challenge of how best to harness the power 
of community banks as a mechanism for providing direct, long-term 
financial investments to collaborative business networks and other 
successful — but undercapitalized — businesses in OZs.  While 
policymakers and scholars have raised promising regulatory 
approaches, they lack the programmatic efficiency of providing OZ 
funding directly to community banks, which is what this Essay 
proposes.  This approach also has the benefit of requiring minimal 
and straightforward regulatory changes. 
Presently, community banks and other lenders cannot be OZ 
businesses.42  This is because a business can only qualify as a 
“qualified opportunity zone business” if “substantially all of the 
 
 39. See Kylee Wooten, Measuring What Community Banks Bring to the Table, 
ABA BANKING MKTG. (Apr. 24, 2019), 
https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2019/04/measuring-what-community-banks-bring-to-
the-table/ [https://perma.cc/QS3W-TAD7]; Mark Scott, Making a Difference: The 
Role of a Community Bank, SMART BUS. (Nov. 1, 2016, 12:14 AM), 
https://www.sbnonline.com/article/making-difference-role-community-bank/ 
[https://perma.cc/52HR-48XK]. 
 40. This is exactly the expectation that was articulated by ShoreBank employees 
and borrowers on the basis of decades of experience. See DYAL-CHAND, supra note 
1, at 80. 
 41. Richard Deeg & Iain Hardie, ‘What is Patient Capital and Who Supplies It?,’ 
14 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 627, 627 (2016). 
 42. See O’Neal & Hood, supra note 9. 
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tangible property owned or leased by the [business] is qualified 
opportunity zone business property.”43  This in turn, requires that less 
than 5% of the property owned by an OZ business be “nonqualified 
financial property.”44  However, a large portion of the assets of 
community banks are loans, which are deemed “nonqualified 
financial property” by the Internal Revenue Code.45 
It is a significant lost opportunity that community banks cannot 
qualify as OZ businesses, because they are unable to receive the 
greatest and most direct benefit of the OZ program.  Specifically, the 
OZ program provides a vehicle for direct, long-term, financial 
investments in businesses in areas designated as OZs.46  Because 
community banks cannot qualify as OZ businesses, they cannot 
receive these investments. 
It is reasonable to ask why it is so important for banks to be OZ 
businesses.  What could justify investing directly in community banks 
rather than in the businesses and residents to whom such banks 
provide financial services?  Indeed, these questions seem particularly 
salient because community banks can still support the OZ program in 
significant ways.  For example, and perhaps most importantly, 
community banks can boost the value of OZ investments by 
providing additional financing to businesses that receive such 
investments.47  Relatedly, banks can facilitate OZ financing to local 
businesses by serving as advisors and brokers, especially when OZ 
financing is part of a complex financing package that may involve 
New Markets Tax Credits or other similar programs.48  They can also 
 
 43. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(3)(A)(i). 
 44. See id. § 1400Z-2(d)(3)(A)(ii). 
 45. Id. § 1397C(e) (“For purposes of this section, the term ‘nonqualified financial 
property’ means debt, stock, partnership interests, options, futures contracts, forward 
contracts, warrants, notional principal contracts, annuities, and other similar property 
specified in regulations . . . .”). 
 46. See RACHEL REILLY CAROLL, ENTER. CMTY., OPPORTUNITY ZONES 
PROGRAM: AN EARLY OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM DETAILS AND WHAT’S AHEAD 2 
(2018), https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/download?fid=8856&nid=6212 
[https://perma.cc/YM2A-3P8R]; see also John Sciarretti, What’s Next for 
Opportunity Zones?, NOVOGRADAC (Oct. 22, 2020, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/whats-next-opportunity-zones 
[https://perma.cc/BD43-GN5G]. 
 47. David Black, Leveraging Qualified Opportunity Funds in Bank Community 
Development Strategies, in COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTS INVESTMENTS: 




 48. See id. 
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provide financing to other participants in an OZ transaction, such as 
investors in an OZ Fund, or to the Fund itself.49  However, as the 
remainder of this Part explains, direct OZ investments in community 
banks are crucial because they increase both the likelihood that OZ 
investments will reach the neediest recipients of OZ funds and the 
efficiency with which such recipients can access OZ support. 
Indeed, this recitation of the currently available modes for 
community banks to participate in the OZ program also reveals its 
major weaknesses: the OZ program is currently too indirect and too 
complex to be an effective vehicle for investment in OZ areas.50  It is 
time consuming and expensive for community banks to participate in 
the indirect ways described above.  For one thing, banks require 
capital to provide financing for OZ deals.  However, such capital is 
hard to come by and often is not risk free.  In 2019, the average asset 
size of community banks, which the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) defines as banks that provide “traditional 
banking services in their local communities,”51 was $0.47 billion.52  
Meanwhile, the average asset size of noncommunity banks was $38.4 
billion.53  This difference in asset size has typically meant that 
community banks have to play it safe in their lending portfolios in 
order to continue to meet safety and soundness requirements.54  Thus, 
for example, even though community banks provide more debt 
financing to small businesses than that provided by national banks,55 
the majority of investments made by such banks still prioritize safety 
 
 49. See id. at 5. 
 50. See, e.g., Quinton, supra note 6. 
 51. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 38, at I. 
 52. Id. at 2–8. 
 53. Id. (“[F]rom 1984 to 2019 community banks grew roughly in line with the U.S. 
economy. The average asset size of noncommunity banks in 2019, however, was more 
than 38 times their average size in 1984, since their growth during that 35-year period 
far outpaced that of the broader economy . . . . Between 2012 and 2019, the share of 
banking industry assets held at community banks declined from 14 percent to 12 
percent of the total, down from a high of 38 percent in 1984.”). 
 54. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., A Two-Tiered System of Regulation Is Needed 
to Preserve the Viability of Community Banks and Reduce the Risks of Megabanks, 
2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 249, 341–42 (2015); see also Clifford Rosenthal, Credit 
Unions, Community Development Finance, and the Great Recession, 22, 43, 46–47 
(Fed. Rsrv. Bank of S.F., Working Paper No. 2012-01, 2012). 
 55. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 38, at VII (“Despite holding only 15 
percent of total industry loans in 2019, community banks held 36 percent of the 
banking industry’s small business loans.”). 
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and soundness principles in ways that overly limit their ability to take 
risks in supporting small businesses.56 
Moreover, while banks have the expertise to serve as advisors for 
OZ deals, the financial incentive to do so is lacking.57  Meanwhile, the 
need for community banks to serve as advisors bespeaks the difficulty 
that local businesses and residents have in accessing OZ funding 
without the help of knowledgeable advisors.58 
Recent data about who exactly has been able to make productive 
use of OZ financing bear out my analysis.  Perhaps most troublingly, 
very few Black-owned businesses have been able to take advantage of 
OZ financing.59  One commentator likened OZ funding to the 
Paycheck Protection Plan in that it “failed to reach many minority 
small-businessowners, who lack banking relationships.”60  Brett 
Theodos of the Urban Institute captured the overarching sentiment of 
investors evaluating OZ opportunities: “What we found, looking at 
community benefit projects, is they’re just hard to do, period.”61  The 
perceived difficulty, an obvious version of the long-entrenched 
information asymmetries that worry lenders and investors in urban 
cores,62 has resulted in very few investments in businesses that are 
truly local.63 
Similarly, the apparent assumption made by federal policymakers 
that community banks could lend their expertise to create an efficient 
pipeline of OZ financing directly to local businesses also seems 
unfounded.  A November 2020 article in Bloomberg Tax opened with 
the following observation: “Lenders that have historically provided 
capital to underserved areas — the focus of the opportunity zone tax 
breaks — have struggled to get involved in the burgeoning market for 
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the tax-advantaged investments.”64  As the article described, of the 
1,100 community development financial institutions (CDFIs) in the 
United States, “just a handful have managed to participate, and they 
cite a laundry list of barriers, including an inability to take 
investments themselves.”65  The article cited the design of the OZ 
program and other IRS regulations as impeding access for CDFIs.66  
Meanwhile, OZ financing has generated billions of dollars, much of 
which has not reached the neediest of communities despite giving OZ 
investors significant tax benefits.67 
These reports about the early effects of the OZ program all lead to 
the conclusion that it would make a tremendous difference to allow 
community banks to qualify as OZ businesses.  As one commentator 
has noted: “Unless you have more specific targeting of who the 
beneficiaries are, it’s not going to work.”68 
“Someone needs to underwrite the underwriters.”  This was a 
phrase that originated among the managers of ShoreBank, which was 
the biggest community financial development institution in the 
country before it closed in 2010.69  Although this phrase originated 
well before the OZ program was created, it captures the need for 
access to low-risk financing for those institutions that are best 
positioned to provide financing to long-time residents of OZ 
communities.  To demonstrate the enormous utility of underwriting 
the underwriters using OZ funding, let me address each of these 
pieces in turn, beginning with the utility of direct OZ financing for 
community banks and then turning to the importance of lowering 
risk. 
Currently community banks, including CDFIs, have significant 
capital limitations that prevent them from fulfilling the roles that the 
OZ program seems to expect of them — namely to provide financing 
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that facilitates and supports direct OZ funding.70  Despite these 
constraints, federal and state programs continue to target community 
banks with other forms of funding and assistance.  The recent passage 
of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act 
is a noteworthy example because it allocates $12 billion to CDFIs.71  
However, this financing is not risk free.  This allocation will be 
distributed to individual CDFIs as debt that must be repaid.72  
Moreover, the money comes with additional strings that limit the 
opportunity to create incentives and spread risks, such as restrictions 
on executive compensation, share buybacks, and dividend payments.73  
Thus, while the CARES Act allocation is a powerful beginning, it 
does not remove the very real constraints on CDFIs to meet safety 
and soundness requirements and avoid risk.  These limitations of the 
CARES Act can be expected to translate directly into fewer dollars 
for local small businesses, which again are perceived as riskier lending 
targets, whether rightly or wrongly. 
The second important aspect of underwriting the underwriters is 
closely related: it is crucial to remove some of the risks just described.  
It is essential for federal policy to encourage investment by local 
banks in local businesses rather than to discourage such investment 
by imposing requirements that are meant to avoid risk.  What is 
required today is a set of banking regulations that acknowledge the 
real risk of lending to small, local businesses but that develop ways to 
manage such risk.  While such regulations may well take time to 
develop in order to balance the interests of both lenders and 
borrowers, the obvious beginning point is to find ways to provide 
financing to lenders with no, or at least fewer, repayment strings 
attached. 
This is where the OZ program could make an enormous difference.  
If such regulations were modified to allow long-term investments in 
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“the underwriters,” the risks of lending could be significantly 
alleviated for community banks.  It would be a means of leveraging 
the CARES Act allocation to community banks, providing both a soft 
guaranty of repayment as well as additional capital to support lending 
efforts.  It would eliminate the often-unnecessary hurdles imposed on 
both banks and local businesses that currently impede access to OZ 
funds.74  Most importantly, it would allow funds to be funneled 
directly to communities. 
As the range of efforts to increase OZ participation for community 
banks suggests, as a regulatory matter, it should be a straightforward 
proposition to allow community banks to qualify as OZ businesses.75  
The primary regulatory changes would be made to Internal Revenue 
Code provisions concerning OZs.  In particular, I would propose 
three changes.  First, the definition of “qualified opportunity zone 
business property” should be amended to include “local” loans.  
“Local” here should be defined as commercial loans made to small 
businesses owned by individuals who have been residents of an OZ 
for ten or more years, as well as residential loans to such residents.  
Such a definitional change would allow loans, which are typically the 
largest asset held by community banks, to qualify as OZ business 
property.  It would also increase the incentives for such banks to 
make loans to local businesses that might previously have been 
perceived as too risky.76 
Second, either the Internal Revenue Code itself or IRS guidance 
should include special opportunities and incentives for community 
banks embedded in collaborative business networks to qualify as OZ 
businesses and to benefit from such participation.  For example, IRS 
guidance could provide for a streamlined process for community 
banks to qualify as OZ businesses for a period of years for any local 
loans they make if they can meet certain criteria at the point of 
making the first loan.  Such criteria could include capitalization and 
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asset levels and other markers for proving safety and soundness, but 
they should also include proof of long-term investment in the 
community.77  The idea here would be to reduce the difficulty of 
making a stream of successive OZ investments in local businesses, 
thereby increasing the stability and accessibility of local capital for 
such businesses.  As for incentives to the banks themselves, these 
should include tax incentives that are useful to community banks, 
which cannot currently make much use of incentives that target 
equity investments.78 
Third, as I have discussed elsewhere, banking regulations issued by 
the Federal Reserve Board should be amended to allow community 
banks and their parent holding companies to make both debt and 
equity investments in local small businesses.79  While this may seem 
like a radical suggestion, current regulations already permit bank 
holding companies to make equity investments in community 
development projects.80  Thus, the only necessary rule change should 
be to allow such investments in the same projects that also receive 
debt financing from the bank subsidiaries of such holding 
companies.81  This need has already been identified by industry 
participants: “One of the most commonly cited problems for CDFIs 
trying to get involved in the market is that opportunity funds make 
equity investments, taking ownership of the businesses and projects 
they’re financing, rather than providing loans as CDFIs often do.”82  
By removing the constraint on simultaneous debt and equity 
financing, banking regulations can provide greater incentive and 
support for investment in OZs and, more broadly, across a range of 
urban cores. 
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CONCLUSION 
By harnessing the potential for community banks to serve as 
engines of financial support for successful, small, local businesses in 
OZs, the Opportunity Zone program can make a world of difference.  
Crucially, it can support poverty alleviation and the development of 
stable jobs, thereby fulfilling the uniquely important roles that tax 
benefit programs such as this have been created to fill.  The 
regulatory and programmatic changes required to implement such a 
strategy are straightforward.  All that is required now is the political 
will. 
 
